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Abstract
Imperfect private monitoring in an in…nitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s
Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their
direct neighbors’behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game’s
history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires
the players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a
complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient
enough. All equilibria under exogenously imposed truthtelling extend to strategic
communication, and additional ones arise due to richer communication. There are
equilibria in which a player lies. The ‡ow of information is related with network
centrality measures.

JEL classi…cation numbers: C72, C73, D85
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Introduction

The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a well studied game, not only in Economics, since it captures
many features from reality. The players’ sel…sh behavior leads them to play the Nash
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Equilibrium in strictly dominant actions. However, this is not e¢ cient and all players
bene…t from cooperation. This is achieved, and thus e¢ ciency attained, by repeating the
Prisoner’s Dilemma forever, provided the players are patient enough.
This paper analyzes an in…nitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on
a network. Kinateder (2008) de…nes repeated network games based on any stage game.
All players in a connected and undirected network that is …xed throughout the repeated
game participate in the same stage game at each point in time. A player only observes
his neighbors’ behavior. However, by communicating with them, he receives the entire
history of the repeated game with a …nite delay. For patient players, a Folk Theorem
obtains provided that they truthfully communicate their observations to their neighbors.
For the Prisoner’s Dilemma additional results obtain, in particular, under strategic
communication. All belief-free equilibria extend from exogenously imposed truthtelling
to strategic communication and others exist due to richer communication. The players
may lie, even in equilibrium, and imperfect private monitoring arises endogenously in this
model. The information a player receives is a strategic choice of the other players.
In the literature, frequently, each player in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma receives a
distinct, exogenously determined and imperfect signal of each action pro…le played.1 In the
setup studied here, each player observes his neighbors perfectly, although the information
they communicate him may contain lies. Hence, a slightly simpler version of belief-free
equilibrium is used than in other imperfect monitoring models in which a player observes
the repeated game’s history with a vanishing " noise.
In case the players follow the trigger strategy pro…le, it is possible to relax the assumption of the network’s connectedness and cooperation obtains if each group contains
at least two players and they are patient enough.
The repeated network Prisoner’s Dilemma is de…ned next. In section 3, the basic
di¤erence between the complete and a star network each formed by three players which
follow the trigger strategy is illustrated.2 This result is extended to any connected network, and conditions are given under which it holds for unconnected networks. In section
4, results under strategic communication are given. Before concluding, the results are
allocated to the literature and the informational setup in the network studied here is
related to network centrality measures.
1

A Folk Theorem obtains in Bhaskar and Obara (2002), Sekiguchi (1997), Ely and Välimäki (2002)
and Piccione (2002). Kandori (2002) surveys the imperfect private monitoring literature. Fudenberg,
Levine and Maskin (1994) obtain a Folk Theorem with imperfect public monitoring for any stage game.
2
This part of the paper coincides with the Prisoner’s Dilemma example given in Kinateder (2008).
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2

Preliminaries

2.1

Prisoner’s Dilemma Stage Game and Network

Each player i in the …nite set of players I = f1; :::; ng; where n > 2; has a set of pure actions
Ai = fC; Dg; C stands for cooperate and D for defect. The stage game’s pure action space
is A = i2I Ai ; with generic element a; called pure action pro…le. To emphasize player
i’s role, a is written as (ai ; a i ): For any subset of players S
I; let AS = i2S Ai ; and
denote by aS an element of this set. Player i’s payo¤ function is a mapping hi : A ! R;
and the payo¤ function h : A ! Rn assigns a payo¤ vector to each pure action pro…le.
Given a 2 A; player i’s payo¤ function is
8
>
3
>
>
>
>
>
< 0
hi (a) =
4
>
>
>
2
>
>
>
:
1

if
if
if
if
if

aj = C for all j 2 I
ai = C and 9 j 2 I n fig s.t. aj = D
ai = D and aj = C for all j 2 I n fig
ai = D; 9 j 2 I n fig s.t. aj = D and 9 l 2 I n fi; jg s.t. al = C
aj = D for all j 2 I:

A player’s payo¤ is 3 when all players choose C: It is 4 if he chooses D unilaterally. It is
2 if some other player chooses D as well while at least one player chooses C: It is 0 if he
chooses C while at least one other player chooses D and it is 1 if all players choose D:
The Prisoner’s Dilemma stage game in normal form is the tuple G
(I; (Ai )i2I ; (hi )i2I ): Let the convex hull of the …nite set of payo¤ vectors corresponding to
pure action pro…les in G be co(G) = cofx 2 Rn j 9 a 2 A : h(a) = xg:
The players in set I are vertices of a network g; whose graph is de…ned as (I; E);
where E I I denotes the set of links between them. A link from player i to player j is
denoted by (i; j): Graph (I; E) is undirected, that is, for all i; j 2 I; (i; j) 2 E if, and only
if, (j; i) 2 E: Given network g; a path between two distinct players i and j is de…ned as a
sequence of distinct players i1 ; :::; ir with i1 = i; ir = j; and (il 1 ; il ) 2 E; for all 1 < l r:
Its length is r 1: Let network g be connected, that is, each player is connected to at
least one other player directly and to all others via paths of …nite lengths. The length of
the shortest path between two distinct players i and j is called distance between i and
j: It is denoted by dij : The largest distance (along shortest paths) between player i and
any other player in g is de…ned by di = max dij ; and network g’s diameter is the maximal
j2I

largest distance among all players, that is, d = max di : Finally, denote player i’s set of
i2I

direct neighbors by i(1) = fj 2 I j dij = 1g; and for any 2
m-neighbors as i(m) = fj 2 I j dij = mg:

m

di ; de…ne his set of
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2.2

Communication and Observations

When the Prisoner’s Dilemma is played repeatedly, in each period, a player …rst chooses
an action, in a way speci…ed below, and then makes observations and communicates with
his neighbors. At any t 1; let player i’s set of observations be Obti : It includes all possible
observations that i may make at t of the actions chosen by his direct neighbors and the
information they observed one period earlier which they communicate him strategically.
At any t 1; let player i’s observation be obti 2 Obti ; and denote the observation pro…le
by obt 2 Obt ; where Obt = i2I Obti :
At any t > 1; player i sends a report rit from his set of reports Rit ; to be de…ned later,
to all neighbors in i(1): He reports the information he received at t 1 in a strategic way,
that is, possibly lying. Given obti 1 ; player i lies at t if his report rit di¤ers from obti 1
as follows: he changes the action asj 2 obti 1 ; abusing notation, chosen by some player j
at some 1 s < t to any other action bj 2 Aj n faj g: He reports all other observations
in obti 1 truthfully to his neighbors. Apart from his report, i’s neighbors also observe his
action choice at t:
Observations and reports evolve as follows. At t = 1; Ob1i = Ai Ai(1) ; that is,
player i observes what he and all his neighbors do, while Ri1 = ; since i has no previous
information to report. At the end of t = 2; player i reports to any neighbor in i(1) what he
observed that all his neighbors did at t = 1: Formally, Ri2 = Ai(1) = Ob1i n Ai since a player
never reports what he did, unless this is part of a report he received from a neighbor.
At t = 2; player i observes what his neighbors do and receives their reports, that is,
Ob2i = Ai Ai(1) j2i(1) Rj2 : In this way, a recursive dynamic process of observations and
reports is generated, and at any t > 1; Rit = Obti 1 n Ai and Obti = Ai Ai(1) j2i(1) Rjt :3
Information ‡ows one link per period, and at t = di ; player i for the …rst time receives
a …ltered version of what the most distant player from him did at t = 1: It is …ltered by
the players located on the shortest path between him and the player at distance di from
him. However, links are not only counted along shortest paths, but a link is used several
times on any path (for example, any piece of information ‡ows back and forth between
two neighbors). Hence, a player’s observations and reports grow in size over time since he
receives one report from any neighbor and hands it over to all neighbors (including the
one from which he received it) in the subsequent period.
The players have perfect recall, and player i’s set of private histories at the end of
3

At t = 3; player i reports to every j 2 i(1) what he observed them doing at t = 2 and what they told
him at t = 2; which includes what all players 2 links away from i did at t = 1: Since player i is two links
away from himself, at t = 3; he tells every neighbor what they told him that he did at t = 1:
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period t is denoted by Hit = [ts=1 Obsi : The private history he observed at the end of t
is thus [ts=1 obsi : The players organized in this way play an in…nitely repeated discounted
Prisoner’s Dilemma.

2.3

Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Played on a Network

In the in…nitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on …xed network g; thereafter called repeated network (Prisoner’s Dilemma) game, at each point in discrete time,
t = 1; 2; :::; the Prisoner’s Dilemma stage game G is played.
t 1
1
t
Let player i’s set of strategies be Fi = fffit g1
!
t=1 j fi 2 Ai ; and for all t > 1; fi : Hi
Ai g: At any t 1; player i’s strategy fi = ffit g1
t=1 prescribes him to choose an action. For
t > 1; it maps his set of private histories to his action set. Let F = i2I Fi be the repeated
network game’s strategy space and let strategy pro…le f = (f1 ; :::; fn ) be an element of
1
F: Let player i’s set of communication strategies be Comi = ffcomti g1
t=1 j comi = ;; and
for all t > 1; comti : Hit 1 ! Rit g: Player i’s communication strategy comi = fcomti g1
t=1
prescribes him to send a report to all his neighbors at any t > 1: It maps his set of
private histories to his report set. Let Com = i2I Comi be the repeated network game’s
communication space and let communication pro…le com = (com1 ; :::; comn ) be an element
of Com: To emphasize player i’s role, f is written as (fi ; f i ) and com as (comi ; com i ):
Let F
Com be the strategy and communication space of the repeated network game. At any t
1; each pair (f; com) 2 F
Com recursively generates a
t
t
t
pure action pro…le a (f; com) = (a1 (f; com); :::; an (f; com)); a report pro…le rt (f; com)
= (r1t (f; com); :::; rnt (f; com)) and a corresponding observation pro…le obt (f; com) =
(obt1 (f; com); :::; obtn (f; com)): These determine the action and report pro…les at t + 1:
If truthtelling is assumed or arises endogenously under strategic communication, player
i only selects a strategy while his communication is determined as follows: at any t > 1;
comti : (Hit 2 ) [ Obti 1 ! Rit is such that the mapping from Obti 1 to Rit is the identity.
The players then hand over the repeated network game’s true history.
Given a common discount factor 2 [0; 1); the function H : F Com ! Rn assigns
a payo¤ vector to each strategy and communication pro…le of the repeated network game.
P
t 1
Given (f; com) 2 F Com; player i’s payo¤, Hi (f; com) = (1 ) 1
hi (at (f; com));
t=1
is the (1
)-normalized discounted sum of stage game payo¤s. Given
and g;
the repeated network Prisoner’s Dilemma is de…ned as the normal form game Gg;
(I; (Fi )i2I ; (Comi )i2I ; (Hi )i2I ):
The players commonly know the game played, the network and the strategy choices
available to all players, and importantly, observe their payo¤ only at the end of the
5
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game.4 The discount factor is then interpreted as the probability with which the Prisoner’s
Dilemma is played again in the next period. The probability that the repeated network
Prisoner’s Dilemma ended by period T converges to 1 as T goes to in…nity.

2.4

Individual Rationality and Belief-free Equilibrium

A player’s individually rational payo¤ is the lowest to which he can be forced in a stage
game. It obtains when he maximizes his payo¤ while all other players minimize it and is
called minmax payo¤. For any player i 2 I; let his minmax payo¤ in pure actions be
i

a

min max hi (ai ; a i ):
i 2A i

(1)

ai 2Ai

In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for any player the individually rational payo¤ is 1. It
obtains when all players choose D: This is the unique stage game Nash Equilibrium in
pure and strictly dominant actions. Denote by = (1; :::; 1) the minmax payo¤ vector.
The set of feasible payo¤ vectors of the repeated network game is de…ned as
F = fx 2 Rn j 9 fat g1
t=1 : 8 t

1; at 2 A; and 8 i 2 I; xi = (1

)

1
P

t 1

hi (at )g:

t=1

Any feasible payo¤ vector can be generated by a sequence of pure action pro…les.5
The set of feasible and individually rational payo¤ vectors is denoted by F : It contains
all feasible payo¤ vectors that are larger than or equal to ; and is de…ned as
F

= fx 2 F j x

g:

Any payo¤ vector in this set is a candidate to be supported by a belief-free equilibrium.
In a belief-free equilibrium, each player conditions his action and report choices only
on his observations. His strategy is a best-reply to the other players’ strategies given
his private history but not the other players’private histories. For a formal de…nition of
BF E see Ely, Hörner and Olszewski (2005). In contrast to them, belief-freeness in this
model arises not because the players are indi¤erent between choosing C and D; but rather
since their action and report choices are only conditional on their observations. Moreover,
these observations are precise and not only made with probability (1 "):
4

If a player observes his or all players’payo¤s before, then this could reveal information about other
players’behavior which he did not (yet) observe via the network. The payo¤ would then be a (possibly
imperfect) private or public signal. Both kinds of signal have been studied in the repeated games literature
(see footnote 1), and to extend the results obtained here in this way is left for future research.
5
Any payo¤ vector in co(G) is feasible for 2 (1 z1 ; 1); where z is the number of vertices of co(G): For
any discount factor in this range, sets F and co(G) coincide; see Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994).
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De…nition 1. Strategy pro…les (f_; com)
_ 2 F Com are a belief-free equilibrium (BF E)
g;
_ g1=t+1 are such that for all i 2 I;
of G ; if for all t 1 and given any [ts=1 obs ; ff_ ; com
and all (fi ; comi ) 2 Fi Comi ;
(1

)

1
P

s 1

hi (as (f_; com)
_

(1

)

s=t+1

1
P

s 1

hi (as (fi ; f_ i ; comi ; com
_ i )):

s=t+1

The set of BF E strategy pro…les is denoted by BF E(Gg; ): If truthtelling is imposed
exogenously BF E ET (Gg; ) is adored with superscript ET for exogenous truthtelling. A
strategy pro…le is a BF E if, and only if, no player’s …nite unilateral deviation at any
point in time is pro…table.6

3

The Network makes a di¤erence

The following example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with three players and exogenously
imposed truthtelling, denoted by com
^ 2 Com; illustrates how imposing a network on a
set of players a¤ects the set of BF E: Consider the trigger strategy pro…le. It prescribes
each player to cooperate as long as all players cooperate and to defect forever if any player
defected. Given any network g; the trigger strategy of player i; denoted by f^i 2 Fi ; is
de…ned as follows: f^i1 = C; and for t 1; given obti 2 Obti ;
(
D if 9 1
t such that for a 2 obti ; aj = D; while a j = C
f^it+1 (obti ) =
C otherwise.
Given (f^; com)
^ 2 F Com; for all i 2 I and all t
1; …rst ati (f^; com)
^ = C; and
t and all j 2 I: Hence, for
^
aj = C as well for all 1
second, for all aj 2 obti (f^; com);
P
P
1
t 1
t
1
t
3 = 3:
hi (a (f^; com))
^
= (1
) 1
^ = (1
) t=1
all i 2 I; Hi (f^; com)
t=1

3.1

The Players form a Star

Consider a star (or a line) with n = 3; as represented in Figure 1. The graph of g is
E = ((1; 2); (2; 1); (2; 3); (3; 2)): Figure 2 represents G for n = 3; where player 1 chooses
rows, player 2 columns and player 3 matrices. The trigger strategy pro…le is a BF E of
Gg; under truthtelling if, and only if, all players are patient enough, that is, is higher
than some threshold value. Then, none of them ever deviates. Corresponding conditions
on must hold for the truncation of the repeated network Prisoner’s Dilemma at any
6

Since < 1; a player’s gain from a deviation of in…nite length can be approximated by that of a …nite
deviation. Therefore, unilateral deviations of …nite length from a strategy pro…le are not pro…table if,
and only if, it is a BF E of the repeated network game; see Mailath and Samuelson (2006).
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1— –2— –3
Figure 1: Three players form a Star
3
C

D

1-2
C
D
C 3, 3, 3 0, 4, 0
D 4, 0, 0 2, 2, 0

1-2
C
D
C 0, 0, 4 0, 2, 2
D 2, 0, 2 1, 1, 1

Figure 2: Prisoner’s Dilemma for three players
point in time, that is, given any observation pro…le. A BF E does not impose restrictions
on play after a multilateral deviation by two or more players. Any unilateral deviation
that may arise can be uniquely allocated to one of the following three classes:
1)
2)
3)

initial unilateral deviations,
subsequent unilateral deviations (before the initial is known by all players), and
unilateral deviations when the punishment takes place.

Obviously, unilateral deviations during the punishment are not pro…table since all
players choose D: The resulting action pro…le is the stage game Nash Equilibrium in
strictly dominant actions. Hence, every player best-replies independently of g and of :
For the same reason, no player can deviate pro…tably from the trigger strategy pro…le
in class 2. After a player’s initial deviation, he and any player who knows about it are
best-o¤ to play D forever (rather than to deviate and to choose C at any point in time).
It remains to show that no player has a pro…table unilateral deviation from the trigger
strategy pro…le when all players choose C: Given ; player 2 (who is directly observed by
1 and 3) does not deviate in any period if, and only if,
(1

)

1
P

3

t 1

(1

)

P1

3

t 1

+ 4(1

1

)

+ (1

t=1

t=1

(1

)

1
P

)

1
P

1

t 1

;

t= +1

2

t 1

(1

)

2

+1

(1

) ;

1

;

t= +1

1
:
3
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The value of 13 is not only the threshold value for player 2 in this example but also the
one for all players in a complete network. The network a¤ects, however, the threshold
value of the remaining two players in this example. Given ; player 1 (and similarly 3)
does not deviate from the trigger strategy pro…le in any period if, and only if,
(1

)

1
P

3

t 1

(1

)

t=1

P1

3

t 1

+ 4(1

)

1

+ 2(1

)

+ (1

t=1

(1

)

+ (1

)

1
P

1

t 1

;

t= +2

)

1
P

2

t 1

(1

)

1

;

t= +2

which simpli…es to 2 + 2 1
0: The only positive solution for in this quadratic
equation is
0:414: Hence, in class 1 of the BF E conditions the requirement on ; or
the players’patience, is higher in the three players star network than in a complete one
due to the one period lag with which players 1 and 3 observe each other’s action choice.
This example extends to any star network where n > 3: The player at the center of
the star has the same role as player 2 in this example, and for all other players the same
conditions apply as for players 1 and 3 in this example.

3.2

The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Played in any Network

A similar result holds for any network (with n > 3); in which all players follow the trigger
strategy. In Figure 1 it takes 2 periods until full punishment sets in. In any network, it
takes di periods until all players punish player i: The group of punishers increases strictly
until di periods after i’s deviation. Until then the deviator’s payo¤ is 2 since at least one
player still chooses C: Thereafter, it is 1 forever.
Since the diameter d is the maximal largest distance among all players, for any network
g; there is a discount factor
that solves 2 + d 1 0 such that no player in the
network deviates from the trigger strategy pro…le. Hence, for this strategy pro…le it is
possible to classify all networks that can be formed from the set of players according
to their diameter. The threshold value of the discount factor ; for which no player
deviates from the trigger strategy pro…le, that is, the level of patience required to sustain
cooperation is non-decreasing in the network’s diameter d: Intuitively, a higher diameter
implies that information between at least one pair of players travels over a longer distance.
Although the expression 2 + d 1 0 depends on d; even in large networks the
threshold value for is bounded above by 12 : To see this, take the limit of the inequality
when d converges to in…nity. Since < 1; the term d converges to 0 and the inequality

9
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1
simpli…es to
: Hence, for “moderately patient” players, the trigger strategy pro…le
2
is a BF E in any repeated network Prisoner’s Dilemma.

3.3

The Network is Unconnected

Network g is unconnected if there are di¤erent connected and undirected components.
Suppose that each component contains at least two players. Together all components
constitute network g: All players in a component observe each other and communicate
with each other. They never observe any player in another component nor do they receive
reports about their action choices— the distance between any pair of unconnected players
is normalized to in…nity. However, all players (in the di¤erent components) still participate
in a single Prisoner’s Dilemma game at every point in time.
Suppose that all players in the distinct components follow a modi…ed trigger strategy
pro…le. Any player’s unilateral deviation is only punished by the players in the component,
since no other player ever observes it, although it a¤ects any other player’s payo¤. The
players (in his component) who observe the deviation choose D forever (possibly after
some delay). This is a BF E if, and only if,
(1

)

1
P

3

t 1

(1

)

t=1

P1

3

t 1

+ 4(1

1

)

+ (1

t=1

(1

)

1
P

)

1
P

2

t 1

;

t= +1

t 1

(1

)

1

;

t= +1

+1

(1

) ;

1
:
2

This result shows that for moderately patient players cooperation is a BF E even if a
player never observes the actions chosen by some other participants of the game. It also
holds under strategic communication as follows from Theorem 1 in section 4 and even if
the number of players becomes arbitrarily large. Although the value of 12 crucially depends
on the parameter choice in the Prisoner’s Dilemma in Figure 2, identical qualitative results
would arise in a parameterized Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
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4

Strategic Communication

In this section, the Prisoner’s Dilemma played on any network is extended to strategic
communication. This is challenging due to the bilateral communication structure. To
illustrate some of the encountered di¢ culties, …rst an example is provided. Then, the
trigger strategy and truthtelling are shown to be a BF E under strategic communication.
From this two corollaries follow. Finally, a BF E with richer than truthful communication
is derived and a Folk Theorem is established.
Given any observation pro…le, unilateral deviations from the strategy, from the communication and from both have to be shown to be unpro…table. In particular, deviations
from the communication pro…le under truthtelling, that is, lies have to be dealt with. Two
kinds of lies may occur. A player claims that there was a deviation when there was none
or he does not reveal a deviation and neither punishes it.
Example 1 illustrates the situation in which lying is most di¢ cult to prevent since one
player, called monitored player, has only one monitor.
Example 1. Suppose that the players are asked to tell the truth and to punish any deviation from the strategy or communication. In this case, the monitor, after observing a
deviation of the monitored player is asked to report and to punish it. Does he have an
incentive to lie, by not revealing it, and to deviate simultaneously by not punishing it?
Suppose that the monitor lies and continues to follow the sequence of action pro…les as
if the deviation had not occurred. Then, the monitor is the last deviator and the monitored
player, observing the monitor’s deviation, starts to punish him. Thus, in equilibrium, the
monitor is better o¤ to start punishment of the monitored player and to report the deviation
truthfully. In case the monitor and the monitored player deviated together, and instead of
starting punishment continue to play the initially prescribed sequence of action pro…les,
then this is a multilateral deviation which is ignored in a BF E: Henceforth, in a BF E;
the monitor reports the monitored player’s deviation truthfully.
The trigger strategy and truthtelling are a BF E under strategic communication as is
shown in Theorem 1. In this case, a deviation from the communication pro…le is a lie.
Theorem 1. Let G; g; (f^; com)
^ 2 F Com and 2 [0; 1) be given. Then, (f^; com)
^ 2
ET
g;
g;
^
BF E (G ) if, and only, if (f ; com)
^ 2 BF E(G ):
Proof. Suppose that (f^; com)
^ 2 BF E ET (Gg; ): Then, unilaterally choosing a di¤erent
action than prescribed by f^ after any history, even if it includes lies, is not pro…table for
any player since (f^; com)
^ 2 BF E ET (Gg; ):
11
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Next it is shown that a lie and deviation are unpro…table given any observation pro…le.
Three cases might occur. First, no player has yet chosen D: If a player nevertheless claims
that some other chose D; he starts punishment and chooses D: He lies and deviates since
f^ prescribes him to choose C: Punishment starts as if the player who lied had deviated
himself. Since he cannot deviate pro…tably, he neither can lie and deviate pro…tably.
Suppose next that at least one player has chosen D already. Any player who observed
this should choose D to punish the deviator. If a player lies and claims that there was no
deviation and deviates by choosing C instead of D; as prescribed by f^; he is worse o¤ since
at least the deviator chooses D by f^: Finally, suppose that all players choose D: Then,
all of them are indi¤erent to tell the truth or not since to claim that any player chose
C instead of D; even if this were true, does not change the sequence of action pro…les
played. To lie and to choose C; in this case, is neither pro…table.
Finally, no player’s lie is pro…table given any observation pro…le. A player is indi¤erent
to reveal a deviation from C to D: If he does not reveal it, but still punishes it by choosing
D he starts punishment anyway. Similarly, if he observes a deviation from D to C; he is
indi¤erent to reveal it since anyway punishment started and he continues to choose D:
Hence, lies (without deviation from the strategy) do neither occur after any history which
already includes a sequence of deviations and/or lies.
Suppose that (f^; com)
^
2 BF E(Gg; ): Then, no player ever deviates from
1
fat (f^; com);
^ rt (f^; com)g
^
t=1 ; and neither if truthtelling is imposed exogenously.
1
If the players in any network follow the trigger strategy pro…le and
; as shown
2
in section 3.2, no player ever deviates from the strategy or communication pro…le or from
both, and truthtelling arises endogenously. For some networks, this result holds even for
values of 2 ( 31 ; 12 ):
By the threat of trigger punishment, it is possible to sustain other sequences of action
pro…les under strategic communication as BF E: Let f denote the strategy pro…le which
prescribes for any sequence of action pro…les fat g1
t=1 a conversion to D forever after
observing any inconsistency in the strategy or communication. Given f and com;
^ if is
large enough, no player ever deviates or lies, that is, truthtelling arises endogenously under
strategic communication and (f ; com)
^ is a BF E: This is stated formally in Corollary 1.

Corollary 1. Let G; g; x 2 F and (f ; com)
^ 2 F Com be given. Then, there is 2 [0; 1)
t
1
such that for all 2 ( ; 1); there is fat g1
fat g1
^
t=1 such that fa (f )gt=1
t=1 ; xi = Hi (f ; com)
ET
g;
g;
for all i 2 I; and (f ; com)
^ 2 BF E (G ) if, and only if, (f ; com)
^ 2 BF E(G ):
The proof of this corollary is straightforward. It combines arguments from the proof
of Theorem 1 with mathematical calculations analogous to that in section 3.
12
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That, after observing a deviation, all players choose D; at least for some time, is a
powerful threat. Partly, since it is not required to know the deviator’s name but only
that a deviation occurred. As long as a player identi…es a deviation he can punish it and
another corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 2. Let G; g; (f; com)
^ 2 F Com and 2 [0; 1) be given. Then, (f; com)
^ 2
BF E ET (Gg; ) if, and only if, (f; com)
^ 2 BF E(Gg; ):
Corollary 2’s proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1: If (f; com)
^ are a BF E under
exogenously imposed truthtelling, then unilateral deviations are neither pro…table under
strategic communication.
However, under strategic communication some player’s lie may be part of a BF E;
and thus the set of BF E under strategic communication is not a subset of that under
truthtelling. Suppose that a player is prescribed not to report certain observations which
would trigger punishment by some players. Any network in which one player has only
one monitor is prone to this kind of equilibrium, as is shown in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Let G; 2 ( 23 ; 1) and g be given such that one player in g has only one
monitor. Then, there is (f; com) 2 BF E(Gg; ) such that (f; com) 2
= BF E ET (Gg; ):
Proof. Let g be such that one player, called monitored player, is only connected to his
monitor. Let f be a modi…ed trigger strategy pro…le: each player chooses C at any t; and
D forever after observing any player having unilaterally chosen D or after observing any
inconsistent report. The monitor and the monitored player’s strategy is identical, except
of the monitored player who is prescribed to choose D at t = 1000; and both, the monitor
and the monitored player, ignore this observation of D and continue with the initially
prescribed sequence of action pro…les.
Moreover, com prescribes all players to report truthfully any observation they made,
except of the monitor. He reports the monitored player’s action choice in any other period
than 1000 truthfully. At t = 1001; he reports that the monitored player chose C in the
previous period. The monitor and the monitored player do not punish this lie, though
they punish any other lie they identify. All other players punish any lie they observe by
converting to D forever.
=
Then, for 2 ( 23 ; 1); as is easily veri…ed, (f; com) 2 BF E(Gg; ); but (f; com) 2
ET
g;
BF E (G ) since under com the monitor is prescribed to lie.
Even under exogenously imposed truthtelling, (f; com)
^
2
= BF E ET (Gg; ): Given
(f; com);
^
the monitor truthfully reports the monitored player’s choice in every period.
13
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The other players anticipate the monitored player’s choice of D in period 1000 and it is
commonly known that cooperation breaks down in this period. As in any …nitely repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma with perfect monitoring, cooperation then is unsustainable from the
beginning on.
An interesting feature of this result is that the players prefer to be lied to, rather
than to receive the unpleasant truth of the monitored player’s choice of D: Although it
is common knowledge that the monitored player chooses D in period 1000,7 all players
except of the monitor and the monitored player never observe this choice of D and are
better o¤ to follow their strategy which is not conditioned on the common knowledge of
the monitored player’s choice of D: In equilibrium, a player can permit himself to stand
on a high moral ground and threatens to punish any player’s choice of D since he is sure
never to receive an observation after which he would have to carry out his threat. In case
the monitor were to communicate his knowledge of the monitored player’s choice of D
throughout the network, …rst this would not be a BF E; and second, the players in this
case would want to jointly adopt the monitor and the monitored player’s strategy of not
punishing it.
The following corollary states formally that under strategic communication additional
BF E arise compared with exogenously imposed truthtelling.
Corollary 3. Let G; g and 2 [0; 1) be given. Then, f(f; com) 2 F
BF E ET (Gg; )g f(f; com) 2 F Com j (f; com) 2 BF E(Gg; )g:

Com j (f; com) 2

Thus, every BF E under exogenously imposed truthtelling is sustainable under strategic communication, though there are BF E under strategic communication which are not
compatible with truthtelling. This follows trivially from Corollary 2 and Theorem 2.
Finally, it is possible to establish a Folk Theorem for the repeated network Prisoner’s
Dilemma under strategic communication, that is, every feasible and strictly individually
rational payo¤ vector can be supported by a BF E strategy and communication pro…le if
the players are patient enough. This corollary is a consequence of Corollaries 1 and 2.
Corollary 4. Let G and g be given. Then, for all x 2 F ; there is ~ < 1 such that
for each 2 (~; 1); there are (f~; com)
~ 2 F Com such that (f~; com)
~ 2 BF E(Gg; ) and
H (f~; com)
~ = x:
7

This is a consequence of the common knowledge of the game and strategy pro…le.
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5

Final Remarks

5.1

Related Literature

In the repeated games literature, there are di¤erent approaches to model imperfect private
monitoring in an in…nitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Usually, the imperfection of the
monitoring technology is imposed exogenously and limit results are given when it vanishes.
Several papers in a special edition of the Journal of Economic Theory in 2002 provide
corresponding results. Bhaskar and Obara (2002) and Sekiguchi (1997) analyze beliefbased sequential equilibria, while Ely and Välimäki (2002) and Piccione (2002) study
BF E in which the players that participate in an in…nitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
with imperfect private monitoring are indi¤erent between choosing C and D at any point
in time.
The model studied here is using a simpler version of BF E: A player need not form
beliefs about the history of his opponents since his observations are precise and not only
made with probability (1 "): Belief-freeness arises since the players condition their
strategy only on their observations, while in Ely, Hörner and Olszewski (2005) and in the
above mentioned papers the players have to be indi¤erent among di¤erent actions in order
to achieve it. Imperfect private monitoring in the repeated network Prisoner’s Dilemma is
not caused by an exogenously imposed monitoring technology, but rather by the players’
strategic decisions.
Strategic communication in networks can be modelled in various ways.8 The approach
taken in this paper also relates to the literature on communication in repeated games.9
Few papers combine both ideas. Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) study sequential
equilibria of in…nitely repeated discounted games in which the players form a (not necessarily connected) network. The players publicly announce their own action choices and
observations made about their neighbors in a strategic way, that is, including lies. When
each group contains three or more players unilateral deviations are detectable, and hence,
do not occur in equilibrium. In Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) monitoring, moreover,
is costly. Thus, only one monitor is assigned to every player. After an incompatible
announcement, which in equilibrium does not occur, both players are punished and the
monitor is substituted. In comparison to both papers, the network in this paper is connected, though as seen in section 3.3, the trigger strategy is a BF E also in unconnected
networks, as long as each component of the network contains at least two players.
8

See Hagenbach and Koessler (2009) for one possibility and further references.
See for example Compte (1998), Kandori and Matsushima (1998) or Kandori (2003), who all resolve
imperfect monitoring in repeated games by communication in form of public announcements.
9
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5.2

The most central or best informed Player

There are two ways to identify the most central or best informed player. Depending on
the communication pro…le one or both determine this player’s location.
Under exogenously imposed truthtelling, the most central player is the one whose
largest distance is smallest. He is …rst informed about all other players’action choices at
some point in time. The second concept is Bonacich centrality, as de…ned by Ballester,
Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006). Roughly, it counts the number of paths of di¤erent
length which start in any player i 2 I; weighted by the discount factor : The player
from which more paths stem is most central. Under strategic communication, he receives
the most information which includes what his neighbors tell him that he told them that
they told him and so on. His informational advantage might be of quantitative rather
than qualitative nature. Moreover, the other players in the network accumulate more
information about him than about any other player.
Under truthtelling only largest distances matter while under strategic communication
both concepts are important. Bonacich centrality identi…es the player with more information and largest distances the one who …rst receives (possibly wrong) information about
all other players’action choices. Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006) show that
both concepts do not coincide, and usually identify di¤erent players as being most central.

5.3

Conclusion

Although the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a well-studied game, there are still new results to
explore. This paper studies the imposition of a communication network on a set of impatient players in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The players’level of patience required
to sustain the trigger strategy pro…le as a BF E is larger even in a simple three players
star network compared with a complete one. For su¢ ciently patient players, the trigger
strategy pro…le is a BF E in unconnected networks and under strategic communication.
Any BF E under exogenously imposed truthtelling is also a BF E under strategic communication when the players are prescribed to tell the truth. New BF E arise due to richer
communication and the set of BF E under strategic communication is not a subset of that
under exogenously imposed truthtelling.
That some player’s lie— from which all players bene…t— is part of a BF E; is a feature
frequently observed in reality. In many societies or groups, the existence of “misdeeds”
or “skeletons in the cupboard” is well-known, though no action is taken as long as these
are not observed publicly. The agent who withholds corresponding information has the
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same role as the monitor in Theorem 2.
The results obtained in this paper readily extend to directed networks and to observation and communication structures in which information does not ‡ow one link per period,
for example, since every player takes a di¤erent amount of time to process information.
The model is not presented in mixed actions since a player cannot be forced to a
lower minmax payo¤ using mixed actions, and since all feasible and strictly individually
rational payo¤ vectors can be generated by sequences of pure action pro…les.
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